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Gavin Robert Betzelberger
Off the Beaten Track, On the Overground Railroad: 
Central American Refugees and the Organizations  
that Helped Them
In 1983, Nelson Sosa and his brother were forcefully recruited 
by El Salvador’s Civil Defense Militia before they were old enough 
to go to high school. A year earlier their father, Elicio, had fled the 
country because his colleagues and friends had been assassinated. 
Elicio reached the United States and found help in a newly formed 
network of churches called the Overground Railroad dedicated to 
helping refugees from Central America. With their help he gained 
temporary residence in the United States, found work at a real 
estate agency in Wilmette, Illinois, and worked to rescue his wife, 
two sons, and their other three children.1 
Because the U.S. government was reluctant to grant asylum to 
Central Americans, the Overground Railroad helped refugees secure 
asylum in Canada through primarily legal avenues via an extensive 
network of churches and volunteer communities. Other “tracks” of 
the Railroad focused on delaying the deportation process as long as 
legally possible. Though not openly defiant like some refugee 
advocacy organizations in this period, the Overground Railroad 
successfully delivered thousands of war-torn refugees to safety.
The Overground Railroad helped Elicio get asylum papers and 
mail them to his wife. She then tracked down which boot camp 
Nelson and his brother had been placed in and went there with the 
asylum papers in hand. She confidently asserted that those papers, 
written in English, guaranteed the release of her sons. The guards, 
who were intimidated by the official looking seals and fine print, 
released her boys.  Knowing that the Civil Defense Militia2 would 
soon discover their mistake, she got all her kids on a bus and was 
out of the country before nightfall.3
On June 5, 1985, the Sosa family arrived in Mexico City where 
Ruth Anne and Richard Friesen, Overground Railroad volunteers, 
met them and arranged for the next stage of their journey to the 
U.S. The Friesens literally held the Sosas’ lives in their hands for 
the next several weeks. It was a harrowing journey for the family. 
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They crossed the Rio Grande on the trusses of a sunken bridge, 
were captured by the INS and later released. After almost a month 
of traveling, the Sosa family flew into Chicago. There, Elicio was 
waiting for them with Julius Belser, the founder of the network that 
had delivered them to safety.4 
The Overground Railroad believed that the Sosa family had a 
strong case for asylum in the U.S. even though none had yet been 
granted to Salvadoran refugees in their federal district. In 1986 the 
case, prepared for months by volunteers and pro-bono attorneys, 
went to court. A year after the Sosa family told their story in the 
federal courts, residence cards granting asylum arrived in the mail.5 
Happy though it is, Nelson Sosa’s story belongs within a larger, 
darker chapter. In order to understand the plight of central American 
refugees and the actions and convictions of the organizations that 
aided them it is best to start with the causes. In this case political 
turmoil and social violence in El Salvador and Guatemala dislocated 
hundreds of thousands of people who migrated north. Mexican 
and United States immigration policies forced this dislocated 
population to reside illegally in those countries or to seek asylum 
in Canada. Finally individuals, churches, and communities across 
the U.S. became aware of both the presence of a large population 
of illegal and unrecognized refugees, and their own government’s 
implication in the violence (or at least the complacency that allowed 
it to continue). This awareness and compunction caused them to 
actively search for ways to aid Central American refugees on both 
personal and political levels.
Central American Context
The Sosa family were only one among hundreds of thousands of 
refugees fleeing the violence and instability in Central America during 
the 1980s. In El Salvador, for example, a civil war raged between the 
guerrilla group known as the Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front (FMLN) and the Salvadoran government.6 In this war, the 
clandestine guerrillas were out of reach of the government and 
government-sanctioned paramilitaries, so the government resorted 
to tyrannizing vocal moderates. The Roman Catholic Church was 
one of the most outspoken advocates for social justice and therefore 
became a target for the right-wing death squads.7 These squads 
circulated a flyer reading, “Be a Patriot, Kill a Priest” and terrorized 
many rural churches suspected of sympathizing with the guerrillas. 
This did not stop the church or quell dissidence; quite the contrary, 
the attacks on the church fueled the revolutionary forces.8 
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In 1979, General Carlos Humberto Romero’s dictatorship had 
been toppled without bloodshed by a junta of young idealist military 
officers. The new leaders promised to restore justice, address class 
inequalities, and hoped to reunite the increasingly polarized 
parties. The Carter Administration gave plentiful aid in hopes that 
this coalition government would lead to a more stable democratic 
one.9 Unfortunately, the new junta proved too weak to hold the 
country together. The assassinations of Mario Zamora, a prominent 
politician, and of Archbishop Oscar Romero effectively ended the 
unity movement.10 In the wake of their deaths the country erupted in 
protest and Major Roberto D’Aubuisson Arrieta, already convicted 
for murder, took control of the government. The other military 
leaders fell into line behind the new dictator, who was President of 
the Constituent Assembly and founder of the Alianza Republicana 
Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance, ARENA).11 
D’Aubuisson and ARENA’s hard line against the communist left 
appealed to the new Reagan Administration in the United States. 
Attributing guerrilla warfare and political dissidence in Central 
America to the meddling of the USSR and Cuba, Reagan liberally 
supported the “democratic” anti-communist government.12 
Reagan used El Salvador as a test case for his administration’s 
tough new anticommunist stance in Central America. This new 
campaign was set off with the CIA’s release of the “White Paper,” 
which presented the guerrillas in El Salvador as the tip of an 
intricately planned communist expansion financed by the Soviets 
and orchestrated by Cuba. According to the “White Paper,” the 
Marxist Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua was merely the first 
phase, soon to be followed by communist takeovers in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras. Congress released twenty five million 
dollars in aid, more than El Salvador had received in the previous 
forty years combined.13
In the few months leading up to Reagan’s inauguration in 
January 1981, Cuba had actually shipped arms to the FMLN in El 
Salvador using Nicaragua as a conduit; however, the Sandinistas 
were reluctant participants. They did not believe that the Salvadoran 
FMLN was organized or powerful enough to support as serious 
allies, even though they shared some ideological similarities to the 
Nicaraguan FSLM.14 The USSR was also reluctant if not indifferent 
to the affairs in Central America. Even Cuba retracted its support 
after the failed FMLN January offensive of 1981.15 Thus, under 
scrutiny the White Paper’s factual basis broke down, revealing it 
to be merely a carefully timed political stunt. Nevertheless, under 
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the banner of communist containment, its release successfully 
expanded U.S. military aid to Central American countries with 
dubious human rights records.16
Guatemala, El Salvador’s neighbor and the “White Paper’s” 
supposed “second phase” of communist expansion, had been 
ruled by a military junta almost continuously since 1954, often 
with the support of the United States. However, it had lost its 
U.S. military aid in 1977 under Carter’s increased humanitarian 
scrutiny.17 Then, following the fraudulent election of General Angel 
Anibal Guevara, a group of about twenty midlevel officers seized 
control. They reappointed General Efrain Rios-Montt, justifying 
their actions by pointing out the obvious corruption and human 
rights offenses of the previous regime.18 Rios-Montt announced a 
fourteen-point plan to reestablish a democracy although he did not 
set dates for the accomplishment of that goal. He also proclaimed 
that the government would “achieve individual security and 
tranquility based on absolute respect for human rights.”19 Because 
of Guatemala’s promised human rights improvements, its staunch 
support of the U.S. containment policy in Nicaragua, the recent fall 
of Somoza’s regime in Nicaragua, and threat of a similar coup by 
the FLMN in Guatemala, the Reagan administration reinstated the 
funding Carter had withheld.
To Congress’ credit, funding to Guatemala was heavily 
scrutinized and contingent upon human rights improvements. 
Nevertheless, starting in 1982, Rios Montt launched a massive 
counter offense dubbed by those who witnessed it as the “Scorched 
Death Policy.” It sought to destroy the Guatemalan guerrilla support 
by destroying crops and targeting politically moderate civilians 
in contested regions.20 In the wake of this campaign thousands of 
Guatemalans joined the refugees from El Salvador in fleeing across 
the border to Mexico. 
Refugee Policies in Mexico and the United States
Many of the Guatemalan refugees first crossed the Mexican 
border to the state of Chiapas, where they had familial relations and 
protection and could more easily return home when the violence 
had passed. This region had once been a part of Guatemala and still 
retained many cultural and economic ties to Guatemala. Chiapas 
was poor; two-thirds of the population was without sewage, one-
fifth without potable water, two-thirds without electricity, and less 
than half had obtained a third grade education. There was only 
one hospital bed for every five thousand inhabitants. Initially the 
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refugees were mistaken for the seasonal migration of Guatemalan 
workers, but by 1983 over 35,000 refugees resided just across the 
border of Mexico in the Chiapas region with an estimated 70,000 
living further inside Mexico.21 As Mexico received more and more 
refugees from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, it struggled 
to create a feasible policy for dealing with them. 
The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
helped prospective refugees apply for visas in Mexico, but from 
1980 to1986 only one hundred were granted, and none between 
1986 and 1990, despite the hundreds of thousands of refugees who 
flooded into the country during that time.22 This was partly due 
to the fact that Mexico’s undeveloped immigration system simply 
offered no provisions for refugees. Mexico’s response to the influx 
of refugees was to make a refugee zone, a 150 kilometer-wide berth 
along the “armed curtain” of the Guatemalan border. Guatemalans 
traveling outside the refugee zone would be deported.23 Those 
refugees in the zone stayed in a number of newly constructed 
refugee camps. But conditions in the camps remained poor because 
of the region’s poverty, the inaccessibility of the camps, and the 
Mexican government’s resistance to outside aid. The vast majority 
of the refugees lived illegally in other areas of Mexico or continued 
to work their way north toward the United States.
For the numerous refugees who made it north, the U.S had 
different, yet no more hospitable policies. The United States had 
been clearly biased in favor of immigrants fleeing communist states 
and against refugees coming from U.S. allies. The Refugee Act of 
1980 was aimed at fixing the bias. This was done by broadening the 
language used to define a refugee to include anyone who was unable 
to avail themselves of the protection of their country of origin due 
to a well-founded fear of persecution. However, Congress could 
not agree on the finer points of the new policy so they left details to 
be worked out by the newly formed Board of Immigration Appeals 
and the INS. In practice these organizations followed the State 
Department’s suggestions rather than acting as an independent 
bodies.24 Because El Salvador and Guatemala were democracies 
supported by the U.S., the Reagan Administration was reluctant 
to admit the human rights offenses caused by these governments 
and in turn pressured immigration authorities to discredit refugees 
from these countries.25
So, despite the Refugee Act’s “well-founded fear of persecution,” 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees were deported de facto. In 
1988 a training video was released to the public, in which the INS 
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mocked Salvadoran refugees and stated that 99 percent of their cases 
should be denied.26 Not surprisingly, 97 percent of Salvadorans 
and 99 percent of Guatemalans were declined asylum.27 From 1980 
to mid-1985, only 626 out of 10,000 Salvadoran applicants were 
granted political asylum.28 In 1985 a census estimated that only 
80,000 of the 280,000 Salvadorans in the U.S. were legal immigrants 
while only 70,000 of the 205,000 Guatemalans were legal.29 Illegal 
refugees who were caught by the INS were sent to processing and 
holding centers, which came to be called los corralenes—the stock 
pens or corrals—by the illegal refugees. Despite state sanctions, 
INS officers consistently tricked refugees into signing “voluntary” 
departure agreements before letting them meet with lawyers. 
Within a week or two the refugees would be flown out of the U.S. 
and returned to their country of origin. 
U. S. Refugee Aid Movements
The majority of illegal refugees crossed the Rio Grande or 
entered in Florida. By 1983 churches in these regions had begun 
to notice the new trends in illegal refugees. Because many of the 
refugees had religious ties, and the United States was clearly 
involved in the unrest in their countries of origin, these churches 
also felt obligated to do something. Many churches were frustrated 
by the evasive tactics of the INS and the continued deportation 
of refugees to the dangerous situation from which they had fled. 
Numerous independent organizations sprang up to try to assist the 
refugees. Among these, many came to self identify with the well-
known Sanctuary Movement. 
The Sanctuary Movement was started in 1980 by James “Jim” 
Corbett, a Quaker in Arizona. He sent out five hundred letters of 
appeal to the Unprogrammed Friends Meetings across the U.S. From 
these letters the Sanctuary Movement was born. Gambling that the 
U.S. government would not want to square off against churches 
or draw attention to Central America, the Sanctuary Movement 
housed illegal refugees inside their church buildings and tried to 
draw as much attention to their actions as possible.30 
The Overground Railroad and Jubilee Partners, a partner 
organization, took a different approach. Knowing that Canada 
was accepting many of the refugees that the U.S. refused to 
acknowledge, these two organizations went into refugee centers 
and sought out refugees who were interested in securing asylum 
in Canada.31 Canada had two tracks for awarding asylum through 
the 1976 Canadian Immigration Act. Any refugee who made it 
Gavin Robert Betzelberger 23
to the Canadian border gained asylum simply through border 
presentation. However, refugees who applied for visas and asylum 
via Canadian Consulates were eligible for one year of financial 
sponsorship by the Canadian Employment and Immigration 
Commission, CEIC. The pledge of support by Canada included 
language and culture training, money for travel, housing, and career 
counseling for the first year.32 Of 13,000 total refugee sponsorships 
per year, 2,500 were designated for Salvadorans in the late 1980’s.33 
The Canadian Council for Refugees explained their generosity: “If 
we are regarded as among the best in the world it is not because we 
are perfect, but because the standards internationally are so low.”34 
In many ways, Canada could afford to have a generous 
acceptance policy because Mexico or the United States received the 
lion’s share of Central American refugees. Canada may have also 
seen immigrants as potential settlers for its still developing frontier. 
But its open door policy also stemmed from a keen awareness of its 
own cultural history. In the previous decade Canada had received 
Indo-Chinese Refugees. And Canada received a great number of 
Mennonite and Brethren refugees in the eighteenth century, groups 
who had strong representation in the Canadian Parliament. 
Origins of the Overground Railroad
The Overground Railroad originated from a Mennonite intentional 
community called Reba Place Fellowship in Evanston, Illinois. Reba 
Place started from a small but radical religious reform know as the 
Concerns Movement, named after a series of pamphlets published by 
a Mennonite press and circulated among the Mennonite and Brethren 
churches. These pamphlets criticized the complacency of the church 
in Europe for not acting decisively leading up to World War II and 
for not speaking out against the obvious injustice during the war.35 
These pamphlets emphasized social justice and responsibility and 
stressed the danger of alignment with government. Some of the most 
influential theologians in Mennonite history struggled during this 
period over the relationship between the church and state. Out of 
this context, a small group of students from Goshen College, Indiana, 
started a communal house they called Fellowship House. Here, under 
the guidance of John Miller, a seminary professor, they experimented 
with a community model based on the church in the biblical Book 
of Acts.36 John Miller was soon put on “active leave” because of his 
radical theology, but, ironically, he used this free time to establish 
a Voluntary Service unit in Chicago from which Fellowship House 
expanded and become Reba Place.37 
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In Comer, Georgia, there was a similar, though rural-based, 
intentional community named Koinonia. Koinonia was founded 
in 1942 with the help of the radical Christian author Clarence 
Johnson.38 Because Reba Place Fellowship and Koinonia shared an 
emphasis on social justice, pacifism, and close-knit common-purse 
communities, they formed a close bond. By 1980 Kiononia had 
already begun to work with refugee issues by forming a nonprofit 
organization they called Jubilee Partners, which primarily helped 
Cuban refugees.39 Subsequently, they created a refugee training 
program and worked the Canadian consulate in Atlanta to gain 
visas for the Central American refugees. Jubilee Partners had 
already helped forty-four refugees gain Canadian visas when in 
1983 Julius Belser sent out a letter similar to Jim Corbett’s.40
Julius Belser, who had met the Sosas when they arrived in 
Chicago, was aware of what Jubilee Partners was doing, but he also 
believed there was a great potential for a dispersed network of 
churches and volunteers working with refugees. The name 
Overground Railroad was specifically chosen for this network to 
emphasis its moral connections and physical similarities with 
the Underground Railroad. Additionally, the name suggested that 
this network looked first for legal ways to address the needs of 
refugees. Belser believed that people would act out of a common 
acknowledgement of a Christian responsibility to care for these 
disempowered people: “You too must love the alien, for you once 
lived as aliens in Egypt.”41 He wrote a letter of intent and mailed 
it to the Mennonite and Brethren churches in the U.S., asking 
for support. Next, Belser approached Richard and Ruth Anne 
Friesen, a newly wed couple, about doing reconnaissance in Texas 
to assess how and where Reba Place could help.42 The Mennonite 
Central Committee, MCC, sponsored this three-month exploration. 
Before the end of the three months the Overground Railroad had 
already taken its first two families to asylum in Canada. They also 
published the first three issues of the Overground Railroad’s 
newsletter, the Telegraph News. The newsletter contained a definite 
tone of urgency. Belser and the Friesens realized almost immediately 
that there was an immense need for a network like the Overground 
Railroad.43 
The Friesens returned to Reba Place and discerned what 
specifically was needed. There was a great need for transportation, 
housing, legal defense, and other amenities for the refugees. The 
Overground Railroad would essentially supplement the separate 
Sanctuary Movement by pursuing legal routes and means. While at 
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Reba, funds were raised to provide all the operating expenses for a 
yearlong residence for the Friesens in southwestern Texas.44
The strategy of the Overground Railroad was to secure for 
refugees who had already been captured a voluntary departure 
with permission to travel, or to get them into the asylum process, 
which ensured them legal residence for a few months. Voluntary 
departure contracts guaranteed that refugees would leave the 
country of their own will within an allotted period of time, typically 
a few months, but allowed them to stay legally in the United States 
until they left. These few pivotal months were gained by showing 
that the refugee had resources to apply for a Canadian visa and 
the means to feed and house themselves in the mean time. After 
a while the organizations themselves gained enough repute that a 
simple letter vouching for the refugee was enough.45 
Refugees were recruited for the Overground Railroad from 
South Texas refugee shelters and INS detention centers. Refugees in 
the detention centers would typically be deported within twenty-
five days and because deported refugees had frequently been 
assassinated when they arrived in their countries of origin, they 
were a very high priority for the Railroad.46 Since the majority of the 
refugees were bailed out of detention centers, one of the primary 
needs was for bail funds. Because bail was returned when the 
refugee was admitted to Canada, this fund could be used cyclically. 
The revolving bail fund was created almost exclusively from 
personal donations. Donors could expect to eventually receive 
their money back and could withdraw their funds if they needed. 
Personal loans were also taken out in a pinch.47 Once temporary 
legal residence had been gained, the refugees would leave the Rio 
Grande Valley in volunteers’ cars or on the “Year of Jubilee,” an old 
bus that the Overground Railroad and Jubilee Partners used.48 
Refugees would be taken to Jubilee Partners or to other 
communities dispersed throughout the Midwest. Jubilee Partners 
housed forty or so refugees at their communal farm in Georgia, 
using the same strategy to gain temporary legal residence for their 
refugees. In addition, while at the farm refugees were enrolled in 
a three-month orientation and language course, the purpose of 
which was to improve refugees’ chances of asylum (the ability to 
speak English was looked upon favorably) and to prepare them for 
adapting to life in Canada. The Canadian consulate would meet the 
refugees either in Atlanta or at the Koinonia farm for an interview. 
Virtually all refugees who applied through this program were 
granted asylum in Canada.49
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The most significant difference in Reba Place’s complimentary 
program was the use of a dispersed network of churches and 
communities. This entire network, rather than exclusively Reba 
Place Fellowship, bore the cost of supporting refugees during the 
sometimes lengthy asylum process. Basic requirements for a church 
or support group included a Spanish speaker who could translate 
and a place for the refugee to stay with basic provisions for six to 
twelve weeks. The group would line up a medical examination 
(required for a Canadian visa), something to do during the day if 
possible, and a friend for emotional support who could also help 
them get ready for their interview.50
The biggest limiting variable in the network was the 
sponsorship of refugees once they made it to Canada. Assuming 
that most refugees apply from their country of origin or neighboring 
countries, the CEIC granted only 450 of the 2,500 sponsorships to 
refugees applying from consulates within the U.S.51 There was a far 
greater need for support of refugees sojourning through the U.S., 
so the Overground Railroad turned to the Canadian Mennonite-
Brethren church networks for support. The 1976 Canadian 
immigrant legislation had also permitted the private sponsorship 
of additional refugees in the CEIC refugee program. In fact, the 
Canadian churches, service clubs, and NGO’s had already utilized 
this apparatus to provide relief to 25,000 Indo-Chinese refugees 
in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.52 Still, private sponsorship cost 
a church about $250 per person each month, a daunting sum to 
small Mennonite and Brethren churches in Canada. To try to ease 
their burden and encourage more churches in Canada to sponsor 
refugees, the Overground Railroad lined up partner churches in the 
U.S. to share half the expenses.53 The Mennonite Central Committee 
in the U.S. and Canada was helpful in lining up host congregations, 
providing logistical support, and extending its services to the 
refugees. For instance, Mennonite Mutual Aid health insurance 
policies were offered to refugees.54
The MCC had a long history of activism. MCC international aid 
and service efforts began in 1928 when Canadian Mennonites heard 
rumors of plundering, repression and imprisonment of Mennonites 
in Russia. They borrowed $2.5 million from the railroad for travel 
expenses and transported tens of thousands of Mennonites fleeing 
Russia by the Canadian Pacific Railroad to new homes across 
Canada. Canadian Mennonites had since been involved in the aid 
of Chinese Christians escaping to the Philippines and eventually to 
Canada.55 When the Mennonite Central Committee met in 1984 they 
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discussed the importance of refugee work in the U.S. and Canada 
with an emphasis on the work of the Overground Railroad. There 
was some reluctance on the Canadian Mennonites’ part because 
this was a burden passed on by the U.S. churches, but the tradition 
of compassion for the alien was much stronger. For many Canadian 
Mennonites, their own history convicted them to act.56
Articles from Canadian churches appeared frequently in the 
Telegraph News. They typically noted the rapid progress of the 
refugees and tended to express lasting relationships between 
the host communities and the refugees, though more troubled 
letters sometimes arrived at the MCC and Overground Railroad 
administrations. While most resettled refugees adapted quickly 
to their new environment and were eager to help the Railroad by 
sending money and offering their homes as stops, others struggled. 
Many refugees suffered from post-traumatic stress and found the 
culture, climate, and language trying. 
Despite a few hiccups, by mid-1985 the Overground Railroad 
was on solid ground. The hosting and public sharing model they 
had created was so successful that by July the waiting list for host 
churches was more than eight months long. The administrative 
staff—altogether six compensated staff split between Evanston, 
IL. and Brownsville, Texas—was even able to relax a bit about 
finances.57 Then the Canadian Consulate in Dallas directly 
contacted the Overground Railroad and asked it to help them fill 
a bonus 150-person sponsorship quota for that year. The Canadian 
Refugee Board recognized the probable need for more sponsorship 
of refugee applicants in the U.S. and redistributed 150 sponsorship 
slots to its consulate in Dallas for Salvadoran refugees.58 Because the 
government sponsorships relieved the burden from the Canadian 
churches and the organizational burden from MCC, they were highly 
sought after. Instantly, the Overground Railroad switched into high 
gear; this would be the first real test of the Overground network. A 
veteran MCC mission worker volunteered several months to help 
with translating. People across the Midwest sent in money to post 
bail for applicants and cover the additional $6,000 to $10,000 cost 
for processing. In the end it was a success; the Overground Railroad 
alone was able to fill almost half of the new spots.59
Provisional Legal Refuge
In May of that same year, Jim Corbett of the Sanctuary Movement 
asked if the Overground Railroad could help enroll into the asylum 
process refugees who were about to be deported from the U.S.60 The 
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Refugee Act of 1980 had created some avenues for illegal refugees 
to secure safe temporary residence. Until then, the Overground 
Railroad had been getting temporary legal residence for refugees 
through the use of volunteer departure agreements. While the INS 
was willing to grant temporary stays to refugees who agreed to leave 
via the Overground Railroad, voluntary departure only worked for 
refugees they knew they could place in Canada. However, under 
section 208 (a) of the Refugee Act of 1980, aliens in the U.S. could 
apply for asylum while undergoing the deportation process, prior 
to detention, or to a judge by submitting an application during a 
deportation or exclusion hearing.61 Once the asylum process had 
started the refugees could not be deported until the legal process 
was concluded. If refugees were in the asylum process or involved 
in continual appeals, they would be provisionally legal until 
conclusion. Neither Jim Corbett nor the Overground Railroad had 
much hope of achieving actual asylum in the U.S. because success 
rates were less than three percent for Salvadorans and equally 
low for Guatemalans. Nevertheless, if they continued to appeal 
and string out the legal process they might be able to protect the 
refugees and keep them in the U.S. for a few years. So, starting in 
July of 1985, the Overground Railroad started legally bailing out 
refugees from the detention centers and enrolling them in the U.S. 
asylum process. This new bonded refuge was called Provisional 
Legal Refuge or PLR for short.62
PLR did not have relocation to Canada as its primary goal but 
instead sought as great an elongation of temporary residency as 
legally possible. The appeals process alone could last up to three 
years for an asylum case, during which time a lot could happen 
to help refugees. For instance, with the help of his or her host a 
refugee could go on to a declared Sanctuary church. Alternatively, 
a refugee could present him- or herself at the Canadian border for 
asylum without sponsorship, or gain legal U.S. residency through a 
labor certification (meaning they had become indispensable to their 
employer and the U.S. economy), or get in line for visas to foreign 
countries. Another possible reprieve might come from the DeConini-
Moakley Bill calling for a temporary freeze on deportation, which 
the Overground Railroad and MCC supported.63 At the very least 
PLR would keep refugees out of danger for a little longer.
Working With the INS
The INS, for its part, passively impeded the various organizations 
helping the refugees. Many of the churches and organizations 
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affiliated with the Sanctuary movement complained of the constant 
evasive movement of detainees from one facility to another and 
the frequent and unannounced changes in legal protocol.64 These 
frequent changes not only encumbered the legal proceedings for 
asylum cases but also seriously endangered organizations like the 
Overground Railroad. In 1983 the INS in Southern Texas denied 
the voluntary depart forms they had consistently awarded refugees 
headed to Canada. Suddenly finding its legal foundation suspect, 
the Overground Railroad planned to defend itself, asserting that it 
had gone as far as possible under the legal system.65 Although the 
Overground Railroad was never accused of wrongdoing, several 
closely affiliated groups were prosecuted for missteps. On January 
29, 1987 Stacey Merkt, who worked for Casa Romero and Proyecto 
Libertad (two organizations with which the Overground Railroad 
had close ties), began a 179-day sentence for helping to transport 
illegal refugees.66 Casa Romero was also raided by the INS under 
false pretenses, and later forced to relocate. In surprising contrast, 
however, the INS publically stated that it had no objections to the 
work of the Overground Railroad. As Mary Jude Postal explained 
it, “We violate the spirit of the law, but we don’t violate the letter 
of the law… It’s kind of a delicate relationship publically. In the 
Rio Grande Valley, we really can’t use the word sanctuary or our 
contacts in the INS and our ability to work with them would close 
off.”67 
In December of 1988, the U.S. sent agents to Mexico 
and Guatemala to coordinate INS efforts with the Servicios 
Migratorios.68 The next year the number of detainees jumped 
from 15,000 to 80,000 and the numbers have grown higher 
every year since. In March 1989, the INS started a new policy 
of massive detention and deportation. In May they announced 
the early success of this new program. To match the increasing 
refugee processing in Texas, the Overground Railroad set the 
goal of doubling their volunteers in that state by creating a small 
community of volunteers in Harlingen by the fall of 1989.69 
Correspondingly, the Telegraph News, the Railroad’s bi-
monthly newsletter, also shifted from recounting the daily 
exploits of Railroad workers and volunteers to more politically 
relevant information. The newsletter continuously relayed the 
personal stories of its passengers and regularly asked for support, 
but it also began to feature articles written by the various other 
refugee programs around the country. They published special 
editions focusing on the new INS policy, and were featured in 
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several major publications such as the Christian Science Monitor. 
The newsletter included articles by the United Nations Human 
Rights Council and the Latin American press. It also began to 
announce protests, fasts, reform campaigns, and projects led by 
numerous other organizations as well as encouraging its readers 
to join organizations like the Christian Urgent Action Network for 
El Salvador.70 A “resources” section was created on the last page 
of the newsletter listing recent studies, books, and presentations 
available to their affiliated churches and organizations. The 
Overground Railroad also made video and multimedia 
presentations that affiliated groups could borrow to compliment 
their own publicity programs. 
Jubilee Partners and the Overground Railroad were not just 
waiting and working for change in the U.S; they looked abroad. As 
early as 1984, Jubilee Partners sent Don Mosley to France to explore 
the possibility of sending refugees to Europe and Australia.71 They 
sent delegations to Nicaragua and Honduras to better understand 
the political volatility of that region. They visited the refugee 
camps in Mexico to see if there were ways of directly helping in the 
camps and reported back to the network in long, heart wrenching, 
and heavily political letters reprinted in the Telegraph News. The 
Overground Railroad had also started organizing tours of the 
network itself by the mid-1980s. Participants from the affiliated 
churches visited the Jubilee Partners, the Overground Railroad’s 
office in Texas, refugee shelters like the Casa Romero, and the INS 
detention centers.72 
The intimate involvement of every group along the Railroad 
proved to be essential to the movement because it created powerful 
ties between refugees and otherwise unaffected churches and 
communities. PLR and regular sponsors had a direct interest in the 
larger political climate in the U.S. The smallest change in policy could 
seriously affect their new neighbors. The Reagan Administration 
was portraying Salvadoran refugees as Communists, but the 
refugees themselves often contradicted this stereotype. Many were 
union members, farmers, church leaders, and professionals, which 
resonated with the rural Midwestern communities. Their stories 
brought the war, struggle, injustice, and pain of Central America 
home and were too compelling for most communities to remain on 
the sidelines.
By 1990 the network crisscrossed with dozens of similar smaller 
refugee organizations, many of which sprang up to receive refugees 
and later grew autonomous. The Lancaster Inter-religious Network 
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for Central American Refugee Action, LINCARA, was one such 
organization supported by seven different denominations.73 The 
Overground Railway itself displayed a full gamut of different host 
congregation denominations; Presbyterian, Brethren, Catholic, and 
even a school in Kansas that took on the responsibility of helping 
to raise funds. The Overground Railroad also received help from 
numerous legal firms. The most notable organization was probably 
the nonprofit Proyecto Libertad based in Texas.74 As the churches 
and refugee organizations helped by raising money, providing 
housing, educating, and transporting the refugees, the legal firms 
worked the asylum cases and provided legal guidance. 
When the civil war in El Salvador ended in 1992, the Overground 
Railroad ended with it. The United States had clearly perpetuated 
the conflict in El Salvador and Salvadorans had in turn been 
the largest constituency of the Railroad. Many of the Railroad’s 
former passengers returned to try to find families and help the 
reconstruction of their nation. The Overground Railroad and 
various member churches sent individuals to Central America to 
continue what had become a central ministry of reconciliation and 
social justice. In this way many of the communities continued to be 
actively aware and involved in politics and humanitarian action, 
while the Overground Railroad’s transnational track was quietly 
dismantled.
It has now been twenty-five years since Nelson Sosa won 
asylum in the United States. He stayed in Evanston, IL working 
for Reba Place because they “trust [him], and treat [him] like a 
family member.”75 Today the Overground Railroad stands out as 
a reminder that there are ways to pursue social justice within legal 
frameworks. More importantly it stands out as a successful model 
for the mobilization of an unaffected populous. As Sosa puts it, 
“The Overground Railroad was a miraculous scheduling feat.”76 
The Railroad may never have been big enough to bring all the 
thousands of refugees to safety, but it did bring Central American 
refugees and their struggle to hundreds of thousands of Americans 
and Canadians. 
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